Contents


Nothing Is Permitted
An argument for moral eliminativism

Contents


Acknowledgements

Preface


Introduction

Chapter 1
Moral anti-realism

1.1 The argument
1.2 What moral anti-realism is not
1.3 The genealogy of moral anti-realism
1.4 Chapter summary


Part 1

Chapter 2
Moral eliminativism (“To be, or not to be…”)

2.1 Introduction
2.2 Mental eliminativism
2.3 Moral eliminativism
2.4 First objection
2.5 Second objection

Chapter 3
Moral eliminativism (“arms against a sea of troubles…”)

3.1 Ockham’s razor
3.2 Inference to the best explanation
3.3 Belief revision
3.4 Inference to a better explanation
3.5 Three semantic objections

Chapter 4
Moral explanations

4.1 Principles of theory-preference
4.2 Feline combustion and other cases
4.3 Supervenience and moral knowledge
4.4 Conclusion

Chapter 5
Moral phenomena

5.1 Which phenomena?
5.2 Everything you ever wanted to know about the moral phenomena (but were afraid to ask)
5.3 The moral sentiments


Part 2

Chapter 6
A user-friendly meta-ethical taxonomy

6.1 Sayre-McCord’s taxonomy
6.2 What is realism?
6.3 The independence thesis

Chapter 7
The meaning of moral judgements

7.1 Good & bad
7.2 Ought & obligation
7.3 Right & wrong
7.4 Virtue & vice

Chapter 8
What moral facts must be like (I)

8.1 Accessibility

Chapter 9
What moral facts must be like (II)

9.1 Objectivity
9.2 Universalisability
9.3 Non-relativity

Chapter 10
What moral facts must be like (III)

10.1 Rationalism
10.2 The practicality requirement


Part 3

Chapter 11
God and morality

11.1 How a Divine law theory satisfies the constraints
11.2 The Euthyphro di3lemma
11.3 Three naturalisms considered
11.4 Conclusion


Conclusion

Chapter 12
Moralising for fun and profit

12.1 Moral nihilism
12.2 Moral fictionalism
12.3 The facts
12.4 Explaining the moral sentiments
12.5 The objectification of value
12.6 The demarcation of the moral


References


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